Interesting, will look into this. The issue is of course that these tools are optional.

But if they work, they may fix nearly many issues. Some will remain, for example many proprietary apps dont use Github releases, while these may be especially targets of fakes.

Hmm, is that a feature or a flaw?

You still have to give the exec permission to the appimage.

True, but this only prevents against stuff executing itself.

Mandatory access controls and sandboxes only protect the core system. Like installing packages with root.

You put things there privileged, so you know what you run comes from a protected area.

Running things from random directories (like ~/Applications which AppimagePool uses) destroys that.

Suddenly you rely on an executable home dir, which means any regular software (including appimages which are nearly impossible to sandbox) can write to the area where your programs are.

That concept is so broken that it needs to go.

I am against flatpak install --user for that reason, because no program should come from an unprivileged directory.

The issue especially is if it doesnt follow standards. ~/.local/bin is a standard, and with SELinux confined users you may be able to protect that directory. But random ones like ~/Applications that dont follow any standards, will not work.

Maybe no context menu depending on what you mean exactly

The “open with” and “create new” things. Actually,

Flatpaks cannot create “create new” entries too. I am currently experimenting with these, as it sucks to not be able to “create new Libreoffice writer document”. And the xdg-templates directory doesnt do anything lol, you still need desktop entries.

but the rest are fully possible and I do it on a regular basics

The concept of an installer is that the app does that on its own. That is pretty bad and the kind of Windows crap we absolutely dont want.

But on good operating systems, a privileged package manager does all that. Puts the stuff where it belongs. Flatpak for example links the desktop entry that the app itself contains in a sandboxed directory, to the export directory where the OS sees it.

And some portal or whatever deals with the “standard apps” stuff, like that Okular Flatpak will be shown to support opening PDFs.

If apps do this on their own that means a single app can mess up your entire system, also malicious.

Appimage may have tools, I only tried AppimagePool for curiosity and the experience was pretty bad and incomplete.

But the issue is that they were just thrown out there, “here devs, do the same shit you do on Windows, it is totally normal for people to double click an executable, not have any sandboxing, deal with updates on their own, dont have any cryptographic verification, …”.

And only afterwards came the managers, the daemons, which cover a part of it.

They (could) solve:

• being privileged, placing apps in not user-writable directories
• having access to integration locations, that apps should never touch
• downloading from defined, maintained locations (instead of letting people click on random internet malware ads)
• running in the background, notifying about updates
• centrally managing these updates
• verifying signatures before allowing updates
• doing the actual update process (instead of deleting a file and placing a new one)

And they often dont even do that. There are no signatures, as devs were never told “either you add a signature, or people will not install your app”. So there is zero verification

But they dont solve the core issues that are:

• devs were told they dont need to care about…
• creating metadata
• creating a real repository
• signing their apps
• using a standardized build system
• transparently declaring used dependencies (i.e. using a given set of them), thus deduplicating them
• going through a review process
• being affected when dependencies are end of life
• declaring opt-in permissions, so users know if the app is insecure (appimages are impossible to sandbox with bubblewrap, and hard with firejail (which is a setuid binary and had security issues), dont know about nsjail, crabjail, minijail or others)

Flatpak is similar to Android. On Android you still have a package manager but the APKs are signed individually, updates just allowed if the signatures match. So you can sideload how you want, it is still secure.

And using Obtainium, which is kind of like an AppimagePool, you can get all the apps from independend developers.

But they were told they need to follow all these rules, Appimage developers can do whatever they want.

Sorry that was long.

I see you haven’t changed one bit.

Regarding what? XD

elementary has their own repo for their system apps

I didn’t know about the self-hosted snap stores, thanks for pointing it out!

Fedora also has their own flatpak remote, which only includes flatpaks build from Fedora rpms.

Thankfully we don’t have to follow the dumb Android security model on desktops.

on Qubes we still have security through compartmentalization, yet all systems have root access (even passwordless sudo)