Other than (metaphysical) anti-realism, which I’m under the impression is an umbrella for all types of denial that there is an independent, external reality.
I suppose you could even envision someone taking the stance that there is an external reality, because they have found empirical proof, which would make them a realist as well as a proponent of whatever this is.
Hey, I think I found the term I’m looking for. Metaphysical deflationist probably works and is specific enough to communicate exactly what I have in mind. Thanks for the help!
Hmm. That’s more my background. Being a tautology (as all math basically is) isn’t the same as empirical justification, you’re right, even if it’s also very convincing. Most mathematicians take some sort of Platonist standpoint on the origins of math - most would argue even the mind screw infinite structures we encounter in higher mathematics are real in some sense. Personally, I guess I’d say mathematical intuition is an impression of the world we’ve interacted with through evolution and so is still empirical in some sense. When you start doing really weird things with it I’m less sure.
One thing I was thinking about here is Bell’s inequality and how it pretty much disproves the strongest forms of realism if you understand it. I don’t know what the final laws of physics will be like, but when (or if? that last sliver of nature has sure been elusive) they come I’m probably going to adopt their simplest axiomisation as my working definition of reality. Until then, I feel like I shouldn’t pick anything with certainty, lest it turns out there’s even weirder underlying logic with non-subadditive probability amplitudes or something.